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Abstract
A diﬃculty in the development and testing of psychological models is that they are typically
evaluated solely on their ability to ﬁt experimental data, with little consideration given to their
ability to ﬁt other possible data patterns. By examining how well model A ﬁts data generated
by model B, and vice versa (a technique that we call landscaping), much safer inferences can be
made about the meaning of a models ﬁt to data. We demonstrate the landscaping technique
using four models of retention and 77 historical data sets, and show how the method can be
used to: (1) evaluate the distinguishability of models, (2) evaluate the informativeness of data
in distinguishing between models, and (3) suggest new ways to distinguish between models.
The generality of the method is demonstrated in two other research areas (information inte-
gration and categorization), and its relationship to the important notion of model complexity
is discussed.
 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The development and testing of theories is one of the most important aspects of
scientiﬁc inquiry. As psychology has become increasingly reliant on quantitatively
instantiated theories, it has become possible to directly test models against data.
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www.elsevier.com/locate/cogpsychThe precision inherent in these models aﬀords the opportunity to study their inner
workings. Ideally, this precision should lead to very explicit tests, and data that
are clearly explained best by one model. Nevertheless, just the opposite occurs all
too often, making it harder and harder to discriminate between competing models
because they provide similarly good ﬁts to data and equally plausible explanations
of the phenomenon being modeled. This is true of models of categorization (e.g.,
Minda & Smith, 2002), and reaction time (Ratcliﬀ & Smith, in press), for instance.
In this paper, we introduce a new method of analyzing data that is intended to
provide insight into the causes of this congestion and possible ways to alleviate it.
Called landscaping, it provides a visual and quantitative description of the distin-
guishability of statistical models. Instead of comparing models on their ability to
ﬁt a single data set, landscaping steps back from a single data set and takes a
birds-eye view of a pair of models. From this vantage point, one can easily assess
their potential distinguishability and the informativeness of a data set in deciding be-
tween them.
2. Retention data and models
We consider retention functions in order to illustrate the methodology, since there
is a large literature with many data sets, as well as models that are relatively simple
and highly competetive. Furthermore, interest in the form of the retention function
has resurfaced in recent years (Rubin, Hinton, & Wenzel, 1999; Sikstr€ om, 2002; Wix-
ted & Ebbesen, 1991). We begin by summarizing recent work comparing models of
retention.
2.1. Four models of retention
Rubin and Wenzel (1996) attempted to provide some clarity on the form of the
retention function by performing a data-ﬁtting meta-analysis. Some 105 two-param-
eter functions were ﬁt to 210 data sets that were collected throughout the 20th cen-
tury. The inconclusiveness of this review prompted Rubin et al. (1999) to collect
several data that would yield a decisive answer. Each included 100 participants, mea-
sured retention at many time intervals, and was calibrated so that responses would
span the full range of the dependent measure (proportion correct, which falls be-
tween 0 and 1). Our choice of models was largely based on these papers.
We ﬁrst chose the power-exponent (PE) model, based on Wickelgrens (1972)
‘‘strength-resistance’’ theory, and used the full three-parameter version, where the
power is treated as a free parameter, given by y ¼ aexpð btcÞ, where a and c lie be-
tween 0 and 1, bP0, and t represents the elapsed time since stimulus representation.
Given the success of a (slightly diﬀerent) hyperbolic model in Rubin and Wenzels
review, we also included a hyperbolic model (HY), y ¼ a=ða þ tbÞ that corresponds
to the assumption that the odds of retention decline according to a power law (An-
derson & Schooler, 1991; Wixted & Ebbesen, 1997). Additionally, we included the
exponential model (EX) y ¼ aexpð btÞ due to its historical interest. For both the
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we included Rubin et al.s sum of exponentials (SE) model, y ¼ a1 expð b1tÞþ
a2 expð b2tÞþa3. All parameters are non-negative, and (for identiﬁability reasons)
b1 Pb2. The three main parameters in the model, a1; a2, and a3, are interpreted as
three mutually exclusive memory stores, the ﬁrst two of which are most important.
The faster-decaying store, a1, corresponds to something like working memory and
a2 corresponds to a longer-term memory store, while a3 represents very long-term
residual storage.
It is worth noting that in Rubin et al.s experiments y is an estimate of the prob-
ability of correct recall, pðCÞ, which of course cannot exceed 1 at any time, nor can it
drop below 0, irrespective of whether retention was actually measured at that time.
Notice that when t ¼ 0, the SE model reduces to a1 þ a2 þ a3. Unless this sum is 1 or
less, the SE model violates this constraint, and the value of y makes no sense, because
it predicts that more items were correctly recalled than were presented. Rubin et al.
did not restrict the parameter range to prevent this from happening, which can (and
does) result in inﬂated ﬁts to the data. Accordingly we distinguish between two ver-
sions of the SE model, the unbounded SE model (SE-U) used by Rubin et al., and
the bounded SE model (SE-B), in which the constraint 06a1 þ a2 þ a3 61 is added.
It is this latter version that we consider in this paper.
2.2. Methodological issues
In this section, we discuss three important methodological issues. The ﬁrst issue
regards the dependent measure. While the two most commonly used measures in re-
tention are pðCÞ and d0, we restrict our discussion to studies that used pðCÞ. The
main reason for this is that the same retention function yields diﬀerent statistical
models when the dependent measure is d0 than when it pðCÞ, so the data sets are
not directly comparable to one another. In this initial investigation we chose to
use the pðCÞ data sets due to their abundance.
The second issue is how one should calculate the goodness of ﬁt. The commonly
used r2 measure assumes that error variation in the observed data is normally distrib-
uted, which is often reasonable, but can be a problem for a bounded discrete measure
like pðCÞ. At extreme values (e.g., pðCÞ >: 97), the error distribution for pðCÞ is
highly skewed, making a normal distribution inappropriate and leading to distorted
values of r2. A better method in the current situation is maximum likelihood.
1 In-
stead of minimizing the distance between the observed data points and the models
predictions, as in r2, it seeks to make the data seem as unremarkable as possible. This
approach uses the model to assign a probability to the observed data, and ﬁnding the
parameter values that maximize this probability. The value of this maximized prob-
ability is called the maximum likelihood (ML; see Myung, 2003). The ML method
permits the speciﬁcation of an appropriate error distribution, thereby avoiding the
1 As an aside, we note that in many cases r2 or d0 will be appropriate, and there is no reason in principle
why the methods introduced in this paper could not accommodate them.
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portion of success across a series of independent (Bernoulli) trials, the desired error
distribution is the binomial.
The third concern pertains to the data sets themselves. A total of 77 data sets from
16 studies were used in the landscaping analyses. With the exception of ﬁve data sets
from Rubin et al. (1999), they are a subset of those used by Rubin and Wenzels
(1996) review. (Some of the methodological details from the studies are presented
in Appendix A.) Studies were selected that met three criteria, which were intended
to reduce the heterogeneity of the database. (1) The experiments must not have
tested autobiographical memory. (2) Humans must have been the participants. (3)
The dependent measure was pðCÞ, which allows the use of ML with binomial error.
While these criteria provide some degree of ‘‘quality control’’ for the data, there are
two important issues that they do not address. Firstly, they do not ensure that the
data were gathered in a methodologically rigorous fashion. Thus it is possible that
many data sets are ‘‘contaminated’’ by systematic error. In addition, in most of
the experiments, data were averaged across participants, which can distort the under-
lying structure in substantial ways (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2003; Myung, Kim, &
Pitt, 2000). In this paper, we take the data sets at face value.
2.3. Fitting the models to data
As a ﬁrst examination of these models, Table 1 displays their ln(ML) ﬁts to three
recall and two recognition data sets (the old-new and the recognition+know data
sets
2) from the Rubin et al. (1999) study. The SE model provides the best ﬁt, al-
though the HY model ﬁts are comparable for the recognition experiments. What
is most interesting, however, is that the ﬁts to the recall data are substantially worse
than the ﬁts to recognition data.
2 The other two recognition curves from that paper were not used here because they introduce an extra
complication to the analysis. The two recognition data sets that we have used are simple retention data and
can be treated as independent near-replications. In contrast, the ‘‘remember only’’ and ‘‘know only’’ data
are not independent of the ‘‘remember+know’’ data.
Table 1
Fits of ﬁve retention models using ln(ML) to ﬁve data sets of Rubin et al. (1999, top), the average ﬁt to the
remaining 72 data sets (bottom)
Data set EX HY PE SE
Recall: matched color )561 )228 )296 )162
Recall: white )565 )213 )288 )143
Recall: random color )534 )194 )267 )133
Recognition: remember+know )231 )58 )83 )39
Recognition: remember )196 )49 )64 )44
Average from remaining 72 set )60 )38 )36 )31
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of Table 1. Again, the SE model provides the best mean ﬁt, but just as Rubin and
Wenzel found, none of the models emerges as the undisputed winner. The diﬀerences
between )31, )36, and )38 on a log-odds scale are moderate to strong, but less than
convincing in light of the diﬀerence in the number of parameters among models.
3 In
short, this analysis does not obviously discriminate between SE, PE, or HY. How-
ever, it does suggest that the EX model, with a substantially inferior average ﬁt of
)60, is distinctly less impressive than the other three. This large-scale data-ﬁtting ex-
ercise is not particularly helpful in choosing between candidate retention functions.
In the sections that follow we shed some light on the causes of this impasse and what
can be done about it.
3. Introduction to landscaping
This section introduces the basic ideas underlying landscaping. However, since the
technique is partly motivated by the limitations of data-ﬁtting analyses of the kind
presented in the previous section, we discuss these ﬁrst.
3.1. Data-ﬁtting: A local model analysis
A common method of choosing between models is to assess how well they approx-
imate experimental data, whether by ﬁtting the model to the data or by simulating
the phenomenon (common in connectionist modeling). This approach is informative
because the mental process being modeled is reﬂected through the data. However, as
the previous discussion shows, even large amounts of data can still fail to distinguish
between models, especially if the data are not entirely reliable. We refer to this type
of model selection as local model analysis (LMA) because of its emphasis on analyz-
ing (local) ﬁts to data.
There are at least three substantial diﬃculties with LMA. Firstly, psychological
data tend to contain lots of sampling error (i.e., they are noisy), which can obscure
potentially informative trends, or worse, provide genuinely misleading information
about the underlying cognitive process being studied. For instance, when modeling
the similarity between stimuli, it is commonplace to use the statistical technique
known as multidimensional scaling. However, it has recently become clear that
noisy, averaged data can distort the scaling solution in some ways (Ashby, Maddox,
& Lee, 1994; also see Lee & Pope, 2003). This kind of problem is particularly pro-
nounced for non-linear models (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2003; Estes, 1956; Myung,
Kim, et al., 2000), which are increasingly common in psychology. LMA does not
deal with this kind of problem.
3 Our interpretations in this section are based on the scale suggested by Jeﬀreys (1961, see also Raftery,
1995) referring to standards of evidence in science. The relevant qualiﬁcation is that the scale originally
corresponded to marginal likelihoods, not maximum likelihoods, which is the source of our ‘‘diﬀerence in
numbers of parameters’’ disclaimer.
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ﬁrst place. For example, too few variables may be measured, or a poor task might
be inadvertently chosen. When trying to distinguish between retention functions, it
is virtually pointless to have only three or four retention intervals, since any reason-
able function will provide an excellent account of the data (Rubin & Wenzel, 1996).
Thirdly, similar models can be diﬃcult to tell apart on the basis of ﬁt alone, even
when ﬁt to very good data, as illustrated in Table 1. Perhaps ironically, this phenom-
enon can be a natural consequence of good science: competing models will become
increasingly alike if they are able to provide good ﬁts to an ever-expanding pool of
data sets. This trend is evident for many types of models, including both connection-
ist models (e.g., the TRACE and MERGE models of speech perception; see McClel-
land & Elman, 1986; Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000) and algebraic statistical
models (e.g., the FLMP and LIM models of information integration; Anderson,
1981; Navarro, Myung, Pitt, & Kim, 2003; Oden & Massaro, 1978). When presented
with two good models, the best that we can say using LMA is that both models ﬁt
the data reasonably well.
3.2. Landscaping: A global model analysis
Global model analysis (GMA), in contrast, steps back from a particular data sam-
ple and focuses on the behavior of the model as a whole. One form of GMA that we
have studied in prior work is model complexity (Myung, Balasubramanian, & Pitt,
2000; Myung & Pitt, 1997; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002). It is concerned with assess-
ing the inherent ﬂexibility of a model in ﬁtting data. Not only can this property of
model be quantiﬁed, but it can be integrated with a goodness-of-ﬁt measure (ML)
to improve model selection. We will brieﬂy discuss model complexity later in the
paper.
Here we introduce a complementary GMA method called landscaping, an early
version of which was used by Pitt, Kim, and Myung (2003). Landscaping fulﬁls
the above desire to add more meaning to ﬁts to data by increasing our understanding
of the models and data. A related resampling technique that uses the parametric
bootstrap has also been proposed by Wagenmakers, Ratcliﬀ, Gomez, and Iverson
(in press), though their focus is more on local analyses of model mimicry. Similar
procedures are discussed in a more explicitly Bayesian framework by Geweke
(1999a, 1999b). Wagenmakers et al. provide a nice discussion of the relationship be-
tween these techniques.
At its simplest, landscaping is a graphical depiction of the relationship between
two models and experimental data. It is created by ﬁtting one model to many
(e.g., 1000) data sets that were generated by that model using a particular experimen-
tal design (the data generation method is discussed in detail later). Another model is
ﬁtted to those same data sets, and the ﬁts of the two models are plotted against one
another. The scatterplot formed by these points is referred to as a landscape.
Fig. 1 illustrates this schematically for two hypothetical models A and B. Data are
generated from model A, and these data are ﬁt by both models. The x axis in the ﬁg-
ure denotes model As ﬁt, and the y axis denotes model Bs ﬁt. Each of the dots
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x ¼ y), we observe that points above the line correspond to data sets that model B ﬁts
better than model A, whereas the opposite is true of points below the line. This line is
referred to as a criterion line,o rdecision threshold. Data that both models ﬁt very
well will fall in the top right corner, whereas data that both models ﬁt poorly will
fall in the bottom left corner. By plotting a large number of data sets, we obtain a
landscape of relative ﬁts that enable us to see how closely model B can mimic model
A. It would be nice if model A always provided better ﬁts to its own data, but in
practice this is not always true. When comparing ﬁts of models A and B in a land-
scape plot, we denote the comparison B/A when A generates the data, and A/B when
B generates the data.
Because the co-ordinates correspond to log-likelihoods, they combine additively
(see Murray & Rice, 1993, p. 9–11 for a principled discussion). Consequently, the
natural way to measure the distance between two points (x1;y1) and (x2;y2) in a land-
scape is to use the City Block distance jx1   x2jþj y1   y2j. In this way, the plots
Fig. 1. Stylized depiction of a landscape graph in which the ﬁts of model A to a large number of data sets
are plotted against the ﬁts of model B. Since the data sets are sampled from model A, the plot provides an
indication of how eﬀectively model B can mimic model A.
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by-product of this correspondence is that measuring the distance of a dot to the cri-
terion line produces (the magnitude of) the log-odds value ln(MLA))ln(MLB). Fur-
thermore, we can measure how much better on average one model ﬁts the data than
another, by taking the arithmetic mean of all log-odds values. Visually, this corre-
sponds to measuring the perpendicular distance from the landscapes centroid to
the criterion line.
4. Application of landscaping to retention models
In this section, we apply this methodology to the EX, HY, PE, and SE models. As
discussed earlier, our database included 25 unique experimental designs. We ﬁrst dis-
cuss the procedure, and then use it to assess the inherent distinguishability of the
models. Finally, we discuss to evaluate empirical data in a landscape.
4.1. Performing the landscaping analysis
Landscaping involves generating data from one model (HY, for instance) and
then ﬁtting several diﬀerent models (in this case, EX, HY, PE, and SE) to those data.
Generating data from a model is a three step process: randomly choose some values
for the models parameters (a and b), evaluate the models predictions (i.e., ﬁnd y),
and add noise to the data. The ﬁrst of these steps is the most diﬃcult. In the real
world, it is rarely if ever known in advance which parameters are most likely to
be good ones. This is, after all, the very reason for the existence of free parameters.
When comparing two models it is crucial to acknowledge this uncertainty. One way
to do this is to specify a probability distribution over parameter values, and then
sampling the parameter values from this distribution. We used Jeﬀreys (1961) distri-
bution for this purpose (see Appendix B), for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that it is re-
parametrization-invariant. In other words, if we rewrite the same model using
diﬀerent equations, nothing changes. For instance, the functions y ¼ aexpð btÞ
and y ¼ rs t actually describe the same model, since they are related through the re-
parametrization r ¼ expð bÞ, s ¼  ð 1=bÞloga. Unfortunately, the uniform distribu-
tion on (a;b) does not correspond to a uniform distribution on (r;s), and vice versa.
However, it turns out that the Jeﬀreys distribution on (a;b) does correspond to the
Jeﬀreys distribution on (r;s), as discussed by Gill (2002, p. 123–125). Thus the result-
ing landscape does not depend on the way that the equations are written: rather, it is
an inherent property of the model.
The second reason is that Jeﬀreys distribution assigns equal likelihood to every
(distinguishable) distribution indexed by the model (Balasubramanian, 1997), which
make it a kind of ‘‘non-informative’’ distribution within the parameter constraints
(in this case, parameter constraints ensured that the function is always decreasing,
for instance). Although it may be convenient to use more tractable distributions in
other applications, we have not examined the consequences of doing so. Also, in
many situations a great deal of prior information about the parameters is available.
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tion rather than use the uninformed formulation that we have adopted here.
Once a set of random parameter values (e.g., a ¼ :1;b ¼ 2) has been chosen, it is
straightforward to ﬁnd the model predictions (y), by substituting these values into
the model equations. This allows us to move onto the last stage, adding noise to
the data. Since the error distribution for y is binomial, this is trivial. The conceptu-
ally simplest method is to simulate N hypothetical trials, where N denotes the num-
ber of trials in the experimental design. This is done by generating N uniformly
distributed random numbers, and counting the number that are less than or equal
to y. This count corresponds to the number of correct responses for the current time
interval. Once this is done for each diﬀerent time interval, a data set has been sam-
pled from the model.
When the data have been generated, the next step is to ﬁt the models (EX, HY,
PE, and SE) in order to ﬁnd ln(ML) values. This process is no diﬀerent from ﬁtting
empirical data, and can be done by using standard numerical methods. In all of the
current analyses, we used a combination of trust-region and Levenberg–Marquardt
methods (see Nocedal & Wright, 1999), repeated 10 times for each data set using dif-
ferent initial conditions to avoid suboptimal results. The output of this procedure is a
set of four ln(ML) values for each data set, one for each model. After repeating the
data-generation and data-ﬁtting steps 1000 times to ensure that a ‘‘suﬃcient’’ range
of the parameters is sampled, the ﬁts to any pair of models (EX and HY) can be com-
bined to produce a plot like Fig. 1.
An important point to make regarding retention landscapes is that they are sensi-
tive to those aspects of the experimental design that aﬀect the models themselves. The
time interval t appears in all of the equations describing retention functions, which
means that changing the retention intervals changes the landscapes. This is also true
of N, because ML is sensitive to sample size through the speciﬁcation of the error dis-
tribution. However, the landscape will not be aﬀected by changes in other design vari-
ables (e.g., stimuli, task), even thoughthese can aﬀect empirical data. In our collection
of 77 data sets from 16 studies, there are 25 unique combinations of N and t, which
meant that there were 25 conditions in which to compare the four models.
4.2. An illustrative case: The Burtt and Dobell (1925) design
Fig. 2 displays the matrix of landscapes for the experimental design of Burtt and
Dobell (1925), and is fairly typical of the 25 designs. Data-generating models (x axis)
form the rows, and competing models (y axis) form the columns. One striking aspect
of the ﬁgure is the variation in the size of the landscapes. They vary mostly in their
length, and provide an indication of the relative distinguishability of pairs of models.
By looking across rows, the distinguishability of the data-generating model from its
competitors can be seen. While EX and HY are distinguishable from each other, nei-
ther is easy to distinguish from PE or SE. PE and SE, on the other hand, are more
consistently distinguishable from their competitors.
The overall distinguishability of two models, say HY and SE, must be assessed by
inspectingthelandscapesgeneratedbybothmodels,SE/HYandHY/SE.Itisclearthat
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sinceSEcanﬁtmostHYdatafairlywell(meanlogodds ¼ 4.5).Alternatively,ifSEisa
better description of retention, the models are distinguishable: there are data patterns
that SE can ﬁt well but HY cannot (mean log odds ¼ 23.53). Of course, this only im-
plies that they can be distinguished, not that they will be. In order for models to be dis-
tinguished, experimental data need to fall ‘‘in the right spot’’ in the landscapes. This is
not guaranteed to happen in an experiment, an issue we discuss in depth later.
Two of the graphs in the upper right of the matrix look as though their landscapes
are missing. The distribution of points is highly peaked and straddles the criterion
Fig. 2. Landscapes corresponding to the Burtt and Dobell (1925) experimental design. For each subplot,
the data-generating model appears on the x axis, and the competing model appears on the y axis. The or-
dering of models from left to right (and top to bottom) is EX, HY, PE, and SE.
56 D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84line, indicating that the competing models (PE and SE) ﬁt the EX data as well as, and
sometimes better than, the data-generating model. This is as it should be because EX
is nested within SE and PE. Both of these models can ﬁt any data set generated by
EX. The reverse is not true, which is why the EX/SE and EX/PE landscapes in the
lower left corner are so elongated. However, comparison of these two landscapes
shows that the two models are not equally discriminable from EX: mean log odds
for the EX/PE landscape is 2.21, compared with 17.32 for EX/SE. (The reason for
this diﬀerence is not obvious from Fig. 2, because it does not convey an impression
of how dense the points are at diﬀerent locations. The EX/PE landscape is in fact
densely clustered near the criterion line, whereas the EX/SE landscape is more dif-
fuse: the representativeness plots introduced later help to rectify this problem.)
4.3. Distinguishability as a function of design
Changing the number of time intervals jtj or the sample size N can change the
landscape, and thus the distinguishability of the models. The experiments in our da-
tabase vary enough along both dimensions to assess the eﬀect of each fairly indepen-
dently of the other. The top row of graphs in Fig. 3 shows the eﬀects of N on model
distinguishability when jtj¼6. The HY/SE landscape in the left graph is from a re-
call study by Krueger (1929, N ¼ 280), and the one on the right is from a cued recall
study by Runquist (1983, N ¼ 1728). The eﬀect of increasing N is dramatic. The dis-
tribution of points in the low-N graph is highly peaked and centered very close to the
criterion (mean log odds ¼ 3.94), providing little opportunity for ﬁnding discrimi-
nating data. The high-N distribution is much more spread out, indicating that HY
ﬁts many of these SE data sets poorly (mean log odds ¼ 94.3).
Variation in jtj has a similar though smaller eﬀect than N, probably due in part to
its smaller range (5–15). The left landscape on the middle row of Fig. 3 is from Wic-
kelgren (1968, jtj¼5), and the one on the right is from Strong (1913, jtj¼13). Both
are recognition studies with N ¼ 40. The models are essentially indistinguishable
when jtj is small (mean log odds ¼ 0.71), but HYs ﬁts worsens when jtj is large,
making the models a little more discriminable (mean log odds¼8.56). Comparison
of the relative location of the landscapes in the graphs shows that the ﬁts of both
models decrease as jtj increases, a change that is much less evident with variation
in N; note how the landscape slides down the criterion line from the left to the right
graph. The bottom graph shows the landscape with the largest N and jtj in our da-
tabase (Squire, 1989). It provides what might be considered a likely upper bound on
the distinguishability of the HY and SE models.
Although these examples illustrate that N and jtj can aﬀect model distinguishabil-
ity for the four models under consideration, the eﬀects of N are not only much more
potent, but also more predictable. When the mean log odds of each of the 25 exper-
imental designs (collapsed over the 12 model pairings in a design) were correlated
with each variable, the relationship was strong for Nðr ¼ 0:85Þ but weak for jtj
(r ¼  0:09; N and jtj are weakly correlated, r ¼  0:04). We suspect that this is
caused by the diﬀerent eﬀects the two variables have on data-ﬁtting. As N increases,
the models must ﬁt the data more accurately because error variance is so small. This
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ger (1929, left; N ¼ 280;jtj¼6), and Runquist (1983, right; N ¼ 1728;jtj¼6). Those in the middle row are
from Wickelgren (1968, left; N ¼ 40;jtj¼5) and Strong (1913, right; N ¼ 40;jtj¼13). The bottom panel
is from Squire (1989, N ¼ 1078;jtj¼15).
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error variance) pðCÞ at each time value to render the models indistinguishable.
The top panel of Fig. 4 summarizes ﬁndings from all 25 experimental designs,
rank ordered by their mean log odds. The symbols represent the log odds for each
of the 12 model pairings for each design. The legend for the enumerated designs
on the x axis is in Appendix A, though it is not needed here. It is unlikely that
any of the four models could be easily distinguished with the ﬁrst 12 designs (up
Fig. 4. Mean log-odds for all 25 designs and all 12 pairwise comparisons, in order of increasing overall
distinguishability. The upper panel is a close-up view of the 17 least discriminating designs.
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bit more hope, but at best only for one or two model pairs. These 17 designs are
shown in the upper panel of Fig. 4. Of the 8 most informative designs (bottom pa-
nel), it is noteworthy that the only one with N < 400 has 13 time intervals (#18), and
that the three most distinguishable designs all have N > 1000. These are the designs
of Burtt and Dobell (1925), Rubin et al. (1999), and Runquist (1983).
4.4. Distinguishability as a function of models
The relative distinguishability of the model pairs can be seen by comparing the
symbols across designs. When the data were generated by EX, the mean log-odds
is always near zero when compared to PE (grey circles) or SE (black circles), just
as one would expect for nested models. Interestingly, while the EX/SE comparison
(white squares) generally displays one of the highest mean log-odds, the EX/PE com-
parison (white diamonds) rarely fares so well. Together, these ﬁndings indicate that,
while EX is a submodel of both PE and SE, the ‘‘extra’’ PE patterns tend to look a
lot more like EX patterns than the extra SE patterns. Furthermore, since the black
diamonds (SE/PE) are generally below the black squares (PE/SE), it appears that SE
mimics PE better than the reverse. Nevertheless, both comparisons tend to suggest
poor distinguishability across all designs.
Turning to the HY model, it is apparent that neither the HY/SE (grey square) nor
SE/HY (black triangle) comparisons ﬁgure highly in the mean log-odds plots, with
the implication that, although these models are clearly distinct, they mimic each
other fairly well. Nevertheless, SE mimics HY better than vice versa. In contrast,
the HY/EX (white circles) and EX/HY (white triangles) comparisons are much high-
er up in the plots, suggesting greater distinguishability. Interestingly, the white circles
(HY/EX) are generally higher than the grey squares (HY/SE), implying that HY can
mimic SE much better than it can mimic EX. Since EX is nested in SE, this is initially
confusing, but turns out to have a very elegant explanation: The ‘‘extra’’ (non-EX)
data patterns generated by SE tend to look more like HY patterns than do the EX
data patterns. Therefore, when sampling data from SE, there is a tendency to get a
larger number of HY-like patterns than one would if sampling from the EX model.
Analyses such as these, which can be carried out prior to data collection, provide
guidance on the combination of N and jtj needed to distinguish pairs of models. For
example, an N greater than 1000 will be required to distinguish some pairs of models
(e.g., PE vs. SE; HY vs. SE), whereas other comparisons (e.g., EX vs. HY) can get by
with a smaller design (N ¼ 250 appears to be suﬃcient). By stepping back from a
particular data set and examining the overall data-ﬁtting relationship between mod-
els given an experimental design, landscaping enhances model testing by revealing
the potential distinguishability of the models under study.
4.5. Applying the landscapes to empirical data
How do landscapes help with the interpretation of empirical data? The ﬁrst step in
answering this question is to plot the experimental data in the landscape. Recall that
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determined by the relative ﬁts of both models. Experimental data can be overlaid
onto the graph by ﬁtting both models and then following the same procedure. For
a given landscape, the further this ‘‘experimental data’’ point is from the criterion,
the larger the diﬀerence in model ﬁts. Empirical data that fall close to the criterion
are ﬁt equally well by both models.
Fig. 5 displays the HY/SE landscapes for Wixted and Ebbesens (1991) design on
the left, and Peterson and Petersons (1959) design on the right, with the empirical
data (indicated by circles and triangles) overplotted. Despite the similarity between
the landscapes, the empirical data behave rather diﬀerently to one another. In the
landscape on the right, the data fall close to the tip of the landscape, virtually as
far away from the criterion line as possible while still remaining in the SE landscape.
It is as unlike HY as possible while still remaining fairly SE-like. In the landscape on
the left (same recall task, but diﬀerent stimuli) the data sets fall within the landscape,
but adjacent to the criterion line. The SE model ﬁts the data slightly better, but with
log-odds values of 0.72 and 0.42, it is hardly enough to conclude with conﬁdence that
they belong to SE.
Empirical data will move around in a landscape as a function of the models being
compared, since each model ﬁts a given data set diﬀerently. The graphs in Fig. 6
clearly illustrate this point. They are the same as those in the bottom row of
Fig. 2, except that the data from the two experiments of Burtt and Dobell (1925)
are plotted as well. The circles represents the location of the data from the recogni-
tion experiment and the triangles are from the recall experiment. Although neither
data set abuts the criterion in the left-most graph, the recall data are most useful
for discriminating between EX and SE. When the EX model is replaced by the
HY model, just the reverse is the case. When the PE and SE models are compared,
neither data set is useful for distinguishing them, as both lie next to the criterion line.
Fig. 5. Informative and uninformative data. The data on the left are from Wixted and Ebbesen (1991).
The data on the right are from Peterson and Peterson (1959).
D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84 61The landscape itself is especially informative in the right-most graph because even
though the data do not distinguish between the models, it shows the models are dis-
tinguishable: those data patterns that the SE model can ﬁt much better than the PE
model are further down the landscape.
5. Representativeness analysis
Representativeness analysis is a natural extension of landscaping. The aim is to
attempt to quantify the relationship between the landscape and a data set. That is,
the landscape can be used to estimate how typical a pair of ML values are of the
models under consideration. After introducing the measure, we apply it to the 77 his-
torical data sets.
5.1. Deﬁning representativeness
The issue of where data fall in a landscape highlights the fact that the most useful
data are those that are much more representative of one model than another. To be
representative of a model, data must fall in its landscape. On the basis of the land-
scapes in Fig. 6, it would be very strange to recommend the use of one model over
another if the empirical data did not fall within any of the0 landscapes, irrespective
of what the actual ln(ML) values were. If SE tends to generate data in one region of
the plot, and the data fall outside of it, then SE is probably not a very good account
of those data, even if its ﬁt is better than any of the competitors.
Landscapes can be used to indicate how representative the empirical data are of a
particular model (or, more precisely, the representativeness of the ﬁts to that data).
By sampling data from one model and ﬁtting them by it and its competitor, we ob-
tain some information about the probability with which the data-ﬁts will end up in a
particular region of the plot. Therefore, a way to quantify the representativeness of a
region is to estimate the probability that the relative ﬁt will fall within that
region. One eﬀective method is to use Gaussian kernels (e.g., Hastie, Tibshirani, &
Fig. 6. Data sets move as a function of the competing model. The circles correspond to a single empirical
data set (from Burtt & Dobell, 1925), as do the triangles. The landscape data are from the SE model.
62 D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84Friedman, 2001), in which an unknown probability distribution is approximated by
a mixture of a large number of normal distributions, one for each data set in the
landscape (see Appendix B). The result is a distribution of ﬁt representativeness, with
each point in the landscape having an associated probability.
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When a data set falls inside a representativeness distribution, we learn how com-
monplace the relative ﬁt is in the context of the competing model. Such information
can be useful to understand the relative ﬁts. For example, empirical data that are lo-
cated in the region of the landscape near the distributions peak have relative ﬁt that
are quite typical. However, when the relative-ﬁt data set falls outside of the represen-
tativeness distribution, we can take a further step in interpretation and safely con-
clude that the empirical data pattern itself is very unlikely to have been generated
by that model.
Because the ﬁts to an empirical data set can be representative of one, both, or nei-
ther of a pair of models, it is most informative to combine the data from their two
landscapes (e.g., HY/SE and SE/HY) to assess representativeness. This is accom-
plished simply by plotting both sets of landscape data on the same axes, as illustrated
by the bottom graph of Fig. 7. In this graph, the black dots denote data generated
from HY using the design of Burtt and Dobell (1925), and the grey dots denote data
from SE using the same design. Clearly, both models tend to ﬁt their own data better
(since the two sets of dots are very distinct), but there is some region of overlap in the
top right corner. The upper plot shows the estimated representativeness distributions
(SE in white, HY in grey) for the same data. By adding the third dimension, we are
better able to understand the relationship between the models and data, because we
are now shown the probability with which data will fall in any given location.
There are two important points to make about our method. Firstly, notice that the
representativeness distributions cover a much broader region of the graph than the
landscapes themselves. This is a deliberate choice. As Box (1976, p. 792) observes:
‘‘Since all models are wrong the scientist must be alert to what is importantly wrong.
Itisinappropriatetobeconcernedaboutmicewhentherearetigersabroad.’’Ifamod-
els description of the data is only a little bit wrong, then we have found a mouse, not a
tiger.Withthisinmind,weadoptedaveryliberalpolicyandgaveallmodelsthebeneﬁt
of the doubt when assessing representativeness, thereby minimizing the risk of turning
miceintotigers.Thesecondpointisacomplementaryoneandpertainstohowwedealt
with tigers. A representativeness value of zero is assigned to all regions that fall ‘‘too
far’’ from the landscape. Formally speaking, we excluded the most extreme one thou-
sandth of a percent of the distribution. The technique is just like setting a rejection re-
gioninnullhypothesistesting,withanextraordinarilylowa ¼ 0:00001.Thereasonfor
this is that if one model assigns a representativeness of 10 50 to the data and another
assigns 10 45, the correct conclusion is that the data are unrepresentative of both
models. Thus we have found a tiger. If we simply took the log-odds of these two
4 Strictly, what is obtained is a probability density, not a probability. A probability density is the
continuous version of a probability. Thus, whereas probabilities sum to 1, probability densities integrate to
1. As a result, it is possible for a probability density function to exceed 1, so long as the deﬁnite integral
across any interval is less than or equal to 1.
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resentativeofthesecondmodelthantheﬁrst.Whiletechnicallyaccurate,itishardlythe
appropriate lesson to learn from such improbable data.
5.2. Representativeness analyses of retention data
The representativeness of all 77 data sets was measured in the context of all model
pairs. The results are easiest to interpret when the data sets are divided into three
Fig. 7. Representativeness distributions for the HY and SE models. The lower panel shows the landscapes
for these models (HY in black, SE in gray), and the upper panel shows the (very generous) distributions
that correspond to the two models.
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In the ﬁrst category, representativeness is non-zero for both models (i.e., the data fall
inside both of the distributions—see Fig. 7), allowing quantitative comparisons to be
made between them. The points will be located in the regions of the landscape where
the models distributions overlap. Most of the data sets fall into this category (70–
81%, depending on the pair of models under consideration). Fig. 8 plots (the loga-
rithm of) the representativeness probability of all of these data sets with respect to
each pair of models. They are laid out identically to the landscape plots of distin-
guishability, only what is plotted is the representativeness (log probability) assigned
to each empirical data set. Rather than identifying each data set individually with a
Fig. 8. Pairwise comparisons of representativeness probability (densities) when both models perform ad-
equately. Numbers denote the design to which the corresponding empirical data set belongs.
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the experiment in which it was generated. Numbers below the diagonal indicate that
the observed ML values are more typical of the model on the x axis. Just the opposite
is the case for data sets above the diagonal.
The small range of log probabilities on both axes indicates that these data sets are
the mice of our database: the evidence provided by one of these data sets is weak to
moderate. All are highly and similarly representative of the models. Although the
sheer number of these minimally informative data sets might seem startling, it should
not come as a surprise when one considers that all four models ﬁt many of the data
sets well (see Tables 1 and 2). Inspection of these plots reveals that, in the top row,
data tend to fall above the line of equal representativeness, suggesting that HY, PE,
and SE all consistently outperform EX by a small margin. The other three plots are
less clear. While there is some evidence that might suggest that HY and SE outper-
form PE, it is not particularly convincing. There is very little indication that either of
HY or SE is superior: HY wins more often, but SEs wins are more decisive. At best,
such data tentatively suggest (HY, SE)>PE>EX. Perhaps the most important con-
tribution of this ﬁrst and largest category of data sets is to indicate that all models
are ‘‘near the mark,’’ in the sense that they satisfy the necessary condition of captur-
ing well most of the data sets reported in the empirical literature.
The second category includes those data sets whose ML values are representative
of one model, to the extent that they are assigned a non-zero representativeness
probability, but are totally unrepresentative of the other model. These are the data
sets that fall inside one of the model distributions (as in Fig. 7), but not the other. In
these cases, it makes little sense to compare representativeness values (or ﬁt values,
for that matter). Rather, we should simply acknowledge that one model ﬁts the data
suﬃciently well and the other does not. These 13 data sets are listed in Table 2. The
model speciﬁed in each cell provided the superior ﬁt of the pair listed at the top of
Table 2
Data that are qualitatively captured by one model, and not by another
Study ID EX
vs. HY
EX
vs. PE
EX
vs. SE
HY
vs. PE
HY
vs. SE
PE
vs. SE
Bregman (1968) e HY PE SE
Bregman (1968) f SE SE SE
Bregman (1968) g HY SE HY SE
Bregman (1968) h SE SE SE
Burtt and Dobell (1925) b HY PE SE
Conway, Cohen, and Stanhope (1991) c SE HY HY SE
Gehring, Toglia, and Kimble (1976) a HY PE PE
Gehring et al. (1976) b HY PE SE
Rubin et al. (1999) d SE SE SE
Rubin et al. (1999) e HY SE HY SE
Runquist (1983) c SE SE SE
Strong (1913) a HY PE SE
Strong (1913) b HY PE SE
Boldfaced items indicate decisions in which the evidence in favor of making this decision is particularly
compelling.
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ticularly dramatic. In those cases, the data fell within the representativeness distribu-
tion for one model, but fell so far away from the other distribution that—had we not
excluded the tails of the distribution—the representativeness probability would have
been less than 10 40. Once again, a cursory look across columns shows that there is
clear evidence that EX is inferior to the other three models; note the absence of EX
in the cells in the ﬁrst three columns. The results in the last three column suggest that
the ranking of the other models should be SE>HY>PE. However, this ordering is
not decisive since there are data sets in which PE and HY are favored over SE.
The third and smallest category contains the true tigers. Ten data sets, all from
designs 1, 14, and 15, fell so far outside the landscapes of all four models that they
were assigned a representativeness probability of zero. There are at least two inter-
pretations of such universally unrepresentative data: (a) the data are unrepresenta-
tive of all models because the data are just too noisy; (b) the data display
regularities that are not captured by any model. In this latter case, the data do
not tell us which model is to be preferred so much as indicate that they are all wrong.
The retention functions for all ten data sets (3 studies) are displayed in Fig. 9.
The four data sets from Bahrick et al. (1975, left panel), display systematic depar-
tures from monotonicity, suggesting that the data are fairly noisy. Combined with
the fact that this was a ﬁeld study examining long term retention of high school ac-
quaintances, it is almost certain that these data were inﬂuenced by a great many im-
measurable factors. In this situation, we might safely conclude that this noise is the
source of the unrepresentativeness. The cause of the outliers in Runquist (1983, mid-
dle panel) is less clear-cut, since the study was a little more controlled, and the data
do not violate monotonicity quite so extensively. However, the violations are large
enough to conclude that noise was probably a contributing factor to the unrepresen-
tativeness of these data. In contrast, the three outliers from the Rubin et al. (1999,
right panel) study are smooth, monotonic, and highly similar to one another. Since
the three nearly identical curves resulted from three nearly identical experiments, it
would appear that noisy data are not the cause of the unrepresentativeness. One ex-
planation would be that the data may represent a mixture of retrieval from short-
term and long-term memory.
5 Since none of the models discussed here is designed
to deal with this situation, it is perhaps unsurprising that none provide a good ac-
count of the data.
The representativeness analyses provide another example of the usefulness of
landscaping. By mapping the relationship between models and data, we gain new in-
sights about both. When empirical data fall inside both representativeness distribu-
tions, we learn that both models can express some of the regularities present in the
data. Data sets that are representative of only one model take on a great deal of sig-
niﬁcance in discriminating between them. In this way, landscaping adds a new di-
mension to model testing by diﬀerentiating data sets in terms of their contribution
to distinguishing models. Finally, data that are universally unrepresentative indicate
5 We thank John Wixted for suggesting this interpretation.
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one or both). Without a landscape, this crucial circumstance can be extremely diﬃ-
cult to identify. Although poor ﬁts by both models are a good indication that some-
thing is amiss, it is not easy to tell when a ﬁt is bad enough for the data to be
considered unrepresentative of the model. Indeed, Rubin et al. (1999) concluded that
the SE model provided a very good account of their data (though they were ambiv-
alent regarding its overall status), simply because r2 was always greater than 0.9. In
contrast, the landscaping analysis reveals that the SE model (bounded version) ac-
counts only for the recognition data, and that none of the models captures the cued
recall data.
6. Landscaping as a design tool
Up to this point we have discussed landscaping as a method of evaluating past
research. It can also be used to guide future research. In this section, we brieﬂy de-
scribe how the method can be used by experimentalists to learn more about the mod-
els under consideration and how to distinguish them.
If the goal is to test which of two models is superior, then the landscape and rep-
resentativeness plots can help ascertain how they can be distinguished and the degree
to which this is possible. To begin with, the locations and sizes of the landscapes will
reveal the relationship between the models and thus how they can be distinguished.
For example, if, as in Fig. 7, there is an asymmetric relationship between them, data
capable of discriminating between the models can be generated by one model only, in
this case SE. If data are obtained in the center of SEs landscape, they demonstrate
the superiority of SE. On the other had, a test of HY would be much more diﬃcult to
perform because most of the data it generates are ﬁt well by SE.
Fig. 9. Retention functions from Bahrick, Bahrick, and Wittlinger (1975) are in the left graph. Those from
Rubin et al. (1999) are on the right. Data in the middle panel are from Runquist (1983).
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model selection standpoint, ideal data would fall within the landscape of only one
model (i.e., category two in the previous discussion). The ease with which such data
can be produced in an experiment will depend on a host of factors. Recall that the
landscape is created by varying the data-generating models parameters over what is
thought to be a reasonable range. The family of data patterns will likely be larger
than the subset of patterns that humans can produce, so experimenters must rely
on their knowledge of the ﬁeld to identify regions in the landscape that yield plausi-
ble human-like patterns. Once these regions have been identiﬁed, the experimenter
can work backwards from this subset of data patterns and design experiments that
will yield similarly shaped patterns of data in one of these regions. Inevitably this will
require some trial and error on the part of the experimenter, who will have to ﬁne-
tune the experiment (e.g., by altering stimuli, increasing task diﬃculty, etc.) so that
participants produce the desired pattern.
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This method of experimentation might seem disagreeable because it appears to be
devoid of theoretical guidance, but most of the time it is likely to be nothing more
than ﬁne-tuning variables, only it is carried out with knowledge of what the data
must look like to yield maximally divergent quantitative diﬀerences between models.
Comparison of mathematical models requires a level of precision rarely found in ex-
periments, where predictions are most often cast in the form of qualitative, ordinal
diﬀerences. Landscaping is a technique to increase the precision of experimentation
so it approaches that at which the models themselves operate (i.e., the same unit of
measurement). Seen in this light, landscaping is a tool intended to aid experimenta-
tion by bridging the gap between the coarseness of experimentation and exactness of
models.
One way to think about how experimental design inﬂuences the landscapes is to
distinguish between those variables that aﬀect the shape of the landscape and
those that aﬀect where data fall in the landscape. For these four retention models,
only N and t aﬀect its shape. Larger samples and more retention intervals increase
distinguishability (see Fig. 3), providing better conditions under which to collect
informative data. These conditions may be necessary to distinguish models, but
since the relative representativeness of the empirical data—deﬁned as the log
odds obtained from their representativeness probabilities—correlates very weakly
with both N and jtj (at 0.05 and 0.07, respectively), it is clear that they alone
are insuﬃcient.
Other design variables (e.g., task, stimuli, and participants) can aﬀect where data
fall in the landscape, so it is these that must be manipulated to obtain maximally in-
formative data. For example, if changes in task or stimuli produce diﬀerent data pat-
terns, then they will fall in diﬀerent regions of the landscape. On the other hand, if a
variable has no eﬀect on performance (e.g., participant age), the data patterns will be
identical and yield points in the landscape that lie on top of one another.
6 Curiously, this concept is not unrelated to the idea of ‘‘active learning’’ in human inference (Steyvers,
Tenenbaum, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003).
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task and stimuli. Are data from cued recall experiments overall more informative
than data from recognition experiments? Meta-analyses like this are complicated
by the fact that other variables were not held constant across experiments. For ex-
ample, data from cued recall experiments consistently yielded the most informative
data relative to other tasks (recall and recognition), but these experiments were also
the ones with the largest N and jtj. Furthermore, even if these other variables were
ﬁxed, the relative representativeness measure depends not only on experimental de-
sign, but the set of models being compared, as is illustrated in Fig. 6. For these rea-
sons, general statements about how other design variables aﬀect model
distinguishability and selection are diﬃcult to make unless conclusions are restricted
to a small set of models.
In the following two subsections, we illustrate further how landscaping can be
used as a design tool. Other types of models are used in these analyses to demon-
strate the generality of the method. The ease with which model complexity can be
evaluated in a landscape is also discussed.
6.1. Information integration models
Consider the task of distinguishing between Oden and Massaros (1978) Fuzzy
Logic Model of Perception (FLMP) and Andersons (1981) Linear Integration Mod-
el (LIM), which are primarily concerned with questions of stimulus identiﬁcation. A
classic example is the perception of speech when participants see and hear a talker
speak a syllable. How is the auditory and visual information combined into a single
percept (e.g., was it a /ba/ or a /da/)?
Suppose that we decide to try a two-choice categorization task (i.e. choose A or B)
with a two by eight design, and 24 participants. This design involves two diﬀerent
levels of one information source (e.g., visual) and eight diﬀerent levels of the other
(e.g., auditory). Thus there are a total of 16 stimuli that may be produced by com-
bining the two evidence sources. Letting pij denote the probability of responding A
when presented with the ith level of one source and the jth level of the other, FLMP
is characterized by the equation pij ¼ hikj=ðhikj þð 1   hiÞð1   kjÞÞ, whereas LIM
predicts that pij ¼ð hi þ kjÞ=2. The top panel of Fig. 10 displays the results of a land-
scaping analysis for this experimental design, in the form of representativeness plots
for FLMP and LIM. The two distributions overlap partially, indicating that there is
a fundamental indiscriminability of the models using this design. Worse, ML is a
poor criterion because 30% of the LIM distribution falls on the wrong (FLMP) side
of the decision line.
A minor alteration remedies this situation. The preceding design does not ask how
participants would respond when only one source of evidence is provided, even
though the models make diﬀerent predictions in these circumstances. LIM predicts
pi ¼ hi whereas FLMP predicts that pi ¼ hi=ð1   hiÞ. By adding the 10 extra ‘‘unimo-
dal’’ stimuli (two visual alone and eight auditory alone) to the design and then re-
peating the representativeness analysis, we obtain the plots in the lower panel of
Fig. 10. Clearly, the new design is far better able to discriminate between FLMP
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quite eﬀectively. The FLMP data are all on the correct side of the line, and only 1%
of the LIM data are on the wrong side. This design is far more likely to distinguish
Fig. 10. Representativeness plots for data sampled from FLMP (in gray) and LIM (in white) for two dif-
ferent experimental designs. Solid lines denote the ML decision thresholds, and broken lines denote the
complexity-adjusted thresholds.
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favor one model or the other because both representativeness regions are distinct (see
Navarro et al., 2003, for details).
Notice that the decision threshold depends on the measure used to choose be-
tween models. ML, like all measures that are based solely on goodness-of-ﬁt, is bi-
ased in favor of the more complex model: that is, the model which is more adept
or ﬂexible in ﬁtting data. This is very evident in the ﬁrst design, where 30% of the
LIM data sets are on the FLMP side of the threshold. This problem can be remedied
by calculating the complexities of the models and then shifting the decision criterion
upward or downward to correct for the diﬀerence (note that complexity is a property
of the model and the experimental design). After calculating the ‘‘geometric complex-
ity’’ measure discussed by Pitt et al. (2002), we found that the criterion should be
shifted towards the FLMP distribution
7 by 1.88 (the adjusted criterion is indicated
in the plots by the broken line). Although the correction is small, the improvement
is dramatic because the LIM distribution is so peaked: the LIM error rate falls to
3.5% whereas the FLMP error rate rises to only 0.3%.
Contrastingly, in the lower panel of Fig. 10, ML makes no errors on FLMP data,
and only 1% errors on LIM data. Calculating geometric complexity for this design
suggests that the criterion line should be shifted by 4.86 towards the FLMP distribu-
tion. However, the improvement that this produces is fairly small, with 0.2% errors
on FLMP data and 0.01% errors on LIM data. This is because the models are highly
discriminable in this design, so a large complexity diﬀerence has little eﬀect. Since it
can be diﬃcult to calculate geometric complexity (but see Su, Myung, & Pitt, in
press), it is nice to note that landscaping can be used to ﬁnd out when it is really
needed: the potential impact of complexity to be gauged simply by moving the cri-
terion upward and downward.
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6.2. Categorization models
As a ﬁnal example we consider two slightly more complex models, interesting
properties of which come to light when landscaped. These are Nosofskys (1986)
Generalized Context Model (GCM), and an extension of this model, GCM-c (Minda
7 This number diﬀers substantially from that reported by Pitt et al. (2002). The reason for this is that
we have incorporated order constraints on the parameters, whereas Pitt et al. did not.
8 Readers may wonder why a complexity analysis for the retention functions was not presented. The
reason lies in the technical assumptions that underlie the geometric complexity measure. The measure
derived by Myung, Balasubramanian, & Pitt, (2000) is a ratio of two Riemannian volumes: the volume
occupied by the model in the space of probability distributions, and a small ellipsoid near the maximum
likelihood parameters. The derivation implicitly requires that the extension of the model volume be much
larger than the small ellipsoid in every dimension (which is always true as N becomes arbitrarily large).
However, some unusual behavior of the geometric complexity for the retention functions led us to suspect
that this assumption is often violated in the set of designs that we considered (see Navarro, in press). Given
this, we did not feel it was appropriate to compare complexity diﬀerences for these models. Nevertheless,
for the designs with large Ns and jtj (e.g., design numbers 1, 5, 14, 15, and 17), in which this problem is
unlikely to be too severe, the ordering of complexity was always SE>PE>EX>HY.
72 D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84and Smith 2002; Shin & Nosofsky, 1992). In the GCM, the probability that stimulus
i is judged to belong to category K is proportional to its similarity to the exemplars
that are known to belong to that category. That is,
pðKjiÞ¼
X
x2K
Six
,
X
j
X
y2j
Siy:
In the GCM-c model, the probability of category membership is assumed to be
proportional to some power c of the similarity-to-exemplars:
pðKjiÞ¼
X
x2K
Six
 ! c,
X
j
X
y2j
Siy
 ! c
:
Obviously, the GCM is a special case of the GCM-c when c ¼ 1. In both models,
similarity is assumed to decline exponentially with distance in a psychological space
(Shepard, 1987). In this example, we used the six-dimensional spatial representation
employed in Shin and Nosofskys (1992) Experiment 1. As with previous examples,
we sampled data sets from Jeﬀreys distribution and used these to construct land-
scapes for both models (Fisher information results are presented by Su et al. (in
press)).
The representativeness distributions for these models are shown in Fig. 11. As is
immediately apparent, the models are remarkably diﬀerent from each other. This is
true despite the fact that GCM is nested within GCM-c, arising because the c param-
eter adds a large set of new data patterns that GCM-c can produce and GCM can-
not. This set is so large that GCM-like patterns are very atypical of GCM-c.
Comparison of the solid decision threshold (ML) to the broken one (complexity
adjusted) reveals that the latter is far superior. Since the models are nested, ML clas-
siﬁes all patterns as GCM-c. To compensate for complexity diﬀerences between the
models, the criterion line should be shifted by 5.2units, resulting in a drop in error
rate, 0% for GCM-c data, but still 67% for GCM data. While this is clearly a sub-
stantial improvement, it leaves a great deal to be desired.
Why was the complexity adjustment not better? Inspection of the representative-
ness landscapes in Fig. 11 reveals that complexity only partly accounts for the diﬀer-
ences between the models. Complexity measures consider the relationship between a
model and data, but do not consider the interrelationship between models. The result
is that in this kind of model discrimination task, a complexity measure can suggest
only a constant correction to the ML decision threshold. In this case, however, GCM
and GCM-c have a complicated relationship with each other as well as the data. As
is clear from the top-down view shown in the inset of Fig. 11 (looking down on the
distributions from above), the tails of the GCM-c distribution ‘‘wrap around’’ the
GCM distribution. Because the GCM distribution is so sharply deﬁned, almost
any pattern inside that region (which is basically a semi-circular area) is more repre-
sentative of GCM: anything outside of this area is more representative of GCM-c.
Therefore, the best way to discriminate between these models would be to deﬁne a
non-linear decision threshold along the borders of this semi-circular region. Mea-
sures of model complexity cannot achieve this.
D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84 737. General discussion
Advancement in psychology requires good models and good data. It also requires
good methods of integrating the two. Landscaping connects the them by answering
questions such as, ‘‘What is the relationship between models and data?’’ and ‘‘How
representative are data of a model?’’ The nature of these questions should make it
Fig. 11. Representativeness plots for data sampled from GCM (in gray) and GCM-c (in white). The solid
line denotes the ML decision threshold, and the broken line denotes the complexity-adjusted threshold.
The inset panel shows a top-down view of the same plots.
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data-ﬁtting performance in a single setting.
Perversely, these questions become more pressing and harder to answer the better
we do our jobs as scientists. The retention literature is a good example of this. With
over a centurys worth of data collected, there is little doubt that retention follows a
smooth, convex, monotonically decreasing function, and its long-run behavior
should be slower-than-exponential (Josts law; see Alin, 1997). Beyond this, it is dif-
ﬁcult to discriminate between models that satisfy these constraints if a modelsﬁ tt o
data is used as the sole criterion on which to choose a model. Data-ﬁtting all by it-
self, as we illustrated at the beginning of the paper (Table 1) is simply is not a good
tool for discriminating closely competing models. It is inappropriate given the de-
mands of the job because to advance the science, we need to know more about
the models and data than can be learned from ﬁt alone. Landscaping was designed
with this goal in mind.
Analyses of the 77 data sets in the context of four leading retention models not
only showed how (in)distinguishable the models are, but also demonstrated how
experimental design variables, such as N and t, aﬀect distinguishability. For dis-
criminating retention models, N is more eﬀective than t. Representativeness analy-
ses, in which prior data were merged with the landscapes, enabled us to determine
how informative data are in distinguishing pairs of models. The ﬁts to most data
sets (70% or more depending on the pair of models being compared) are highly
typical of those observed of data generated by all models. Although these data
are not very useful for distinguishing between models, they do show that all models
can capture some aspects of the process underlying retention. A much smaller
number of data sets (17%) proved much more informative, providing clear evi-
dence in favor of one model over another. The results (Table 2) are fairly orderly
and suggest a ranking of SE>HY>PE>EX. However, the analyses also revealed
that the impressively reliable data of Rubin et al. (1999) are unrepresentative of all
models: none of these models could plausibly have generated these data. This in-
dicates that even the best models are incomplete in their description of the form
of the retention function.
The knowledge that landscaping contributes about the relationship between
models and the representativeness of data ﬁts can be used to choose the next
course of action in modeling retention. If the goal is to propose a new model, then
it is not enough for the model to ﬁt the data better than it competitors (SE can do
that), it is also necessary to show that the data ﬁts are representative of this model
(i.e., it could plausibly have generated them). If the goal is to collect new data to
decide between the top two models, for example, one should identify an experimen-
tal design that yields landscapes that do not completely overlap, inspect data sets
in these non-overlapping regions, and then design an experiment to yield such
data.
The preceding discussion brings out the point that landscaping can be used to im-
prove postdiction and prediction in experimentation, serving as a bridge between
model and data. Postdiction is a common form of model evaluation in psychology.
Landscaping makes such tests more stringent because it imposes the additional
D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84 75condition that the data are representative of the new model, not just that the model
ﬁtted the data better than its competitors. Prediction is an even more stringent and
convincing test of model adequacy because the data have not yet been collected.
Landscaping provides the means to identify optimal tests by determining the exper-
imental conditions that will be most favorable to generating data that are more rep-
resentative of one model than another.
Even with an intimate knowledge of a ﬁeld, it can be diﬃcult to predict the
impact of speciﬁc variables on performance. Landscaping allows one to learn
how some design changes will aﬀect model distinguishability. Without this knowl-
edge, the eﬀect of speciﬁc manipulations are unknown and can even be misunder-
stood, as we demonstrated with sample size. An increase in N is not guaranteed
to improve model distinguishability. It reduces error variance, which should assist
in distinguishing models, but unless the data are representative of one and only
one model, the outcome of the experiment may be disappointing. This situation
could be prevented by ﬁrst viewing the relevant landscapes, which collec-
tively would suggest at least one course of action, even if it means trying some-
thing else.
The brief examples of landscaping information integration models and categori-
zation models demonstrate the impact model complexity can have on the landscape
and the tools wider applicability. As is shown in Figs. 10 and 11, a landscape plot is
tailor-made for not only displaying but also evaluating the eﬀects of model complex-
ity on model distinguishability. The criterion shifts toward the more complex model
by the amount it exceeds its competitor in complexity. The eﬀect of this adjustment
will be substantial if the distribution of at least one model is concentrated on or near
the criterion. Otherwise they probably will be negligible. When used for this purpose,
landscaping provide an easy means with which to evaluate the impact complexity
might have on model selection without having to calculate complexity, which can
be challenging.
The method of landscaping described in this paper is applicable to statistical mod-
els (i.e., those for which there exists a likelihood function). As a tool, landscaping is
in principle applicable to any type of model (e.g., connectionist, qualitative). The
necessary ingredients are a way to express the performance relationship between
the models themselves and also with experimental data. We are currently developing
a method to landscape localist connectionist models. Details of this work can be
found in Kim, Navarro, Pitt, and Myung (2004).
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Design Source Mean N jtj ID Participants Stimuli Task Notes
1 Bahrick et al. (1975) 436 9 a Elderly Pictures Recognition Yearbook pictures
1 Bahrick et al. (1975) 436 9 b Elderly Word strings Recognition Names of people from yearbook
1 Bahrick et al. (1975) 436 9 c Elderly Words+pictures Matching Names and yearbook pictures: face!name
1 Bahrick et al. (1975) 436 9 d Elderly Words+pictures Matching Names and yearbook pictures: name!face
1 Bahrick et al. (1975) 436 9 e Elderly Words+pictures Free recall
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 a Undergrads Words Cued recall Semantic association
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 b Undergrads Words Cued recall Stem completion
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 c Undergrads Words Cued recall Phonetic (rhyming) association
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 d Undergrads Words Cued recall Associate (contiguity)
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 e Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired association varied across blocks
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 f Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired association varied across blocks
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 g Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired association varied across blocks
2 Bregman (1968) 92 8 h Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired association varied across blocks
3 Burtt and Dobell (1925) 1160 5 a Undergrads Words Recognition Paired associates learned previously
3 Burtt and Dobell (1925) 1160 5 b Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates learned previously
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 a Adults Words Recognition Names
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 b Adults Words Recognition Concepts
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 c Adults Words Recall Names
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 d Adults Words Recall Concepts
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 e Adults Words Veriﬁcation
4 Conway et al. (1991) 187 12 f Adults Words Veriﬁcation
5 Gehring et al. (1976) 1447 6 a Undergrads Pictures Recognition
5 Gehring et al. (1976) 1447 6 b Grads Words Recognition Nouns denoting the pictures
6 Krueger (1929) 280 6 a Grads Words Recall 100% overlearn: monosyllables
6 Krueger (1929) 280 6 b Grads Words Recall 150% overlearn: monosyllables
6 Krueger (1929) 280 6 c Grads Words Recall 200% overlearn: monosyllables
7 LongmoreandKnight (1988) 240 5 a Adults Words Recall Normals: monosyllables
7 Longmore and Knight
(1988)
240 5 b Adults Words Recall Korsakoﬀs; monosyllables
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Design Source Mean N jtj ID Participants Stimuli Task Notes
8 Longmore and Knight
(1988)
120 5 Adults Words Recall Alcoholics with no signs of Korsakoﬀs;
monosyllables
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 a Grads Trigrams Antic. recall No learning
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 b Grads Trigrams Free recall No learning
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 c Grads Trigrams Recognition No learning
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 d Grads Trigrams Ordering No learning
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 e Grads Trigrams Free recall % of previous learning: 100
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 f Grads Trigrams Recognition % of previous learning: 100
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 g Grads Trigrams Ordering % of previous learning: 100
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 h Grads Trigrams Free recall % of previous learning: 67
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 i Grads Trigrams Recognition % of previous learning: 67
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 j Grads Trigrams Ordering % of previous learning: 67
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 k Grads Trigrams Free recall % of previous learning: 33
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 1 Grads Trigrams Recognition % of previous learning: 33
9 Luh (1922) 240 5 m Grads Trigrams Ordering % of previous learning: 33
10 Luh (1922) 240 7 a Grads Trigrams Free recall % of previous learning: 150
10 Luh (1922) 240 7 b Grads Trigrams Recognition % of previous learning: 150
11 MacLeod (1988) 320 5 Undergrads Word+pictures Recognition Paired associates: words were numbers
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 a Undergrads Trigrams Recall Backward counting interference
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 b Undergrads Words Recall Backward counting interference
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 c Undergrads Word triads Recall Backward counting interference
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 d Undergrads Words Recall Varied # prior words in list 0
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 e Undergrads Words Recall Varied # prior words in list 3
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 f Undergrads Words Recall Varied # prior words in list 6
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 g Undergrads Words Recall Varied # prior words in list 9
12 Murdock (1961) 192 6 h Undergrads Words Recall Varied # prior words in list 12
13 Peterson and Peterson (1959) 192 6 Undergrads Trigrams Recall Backward counting interference
14 Rubin et al. (1999) 900 10 a Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates in same color
14 Rubin et al. (1999) 900 10 b Undergrads Words Cued recall All words white font
14 Rubin et al. (1999) 900 10 c Undergrads Words Cued recall Words in random colors
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414 Rubin et al. (1999) 900 10 d Undergrads Words Recognition Old–new recognition
14 Rubin et al. (1999) 900 10 e Undergrads Words Recognition Remember-know recognition
15 Runquist (1983) 1728 6 a Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates seen 3  previously and
tested
15 Runquist (1983) 1728 6 b Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates seen 1  previously and
tested
15 Runquist (1983) 1728 6 c Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates seen 3  previously and not
tested
15 Runquist (1983) 1728 6 d Undergrads Words Cued recall Paired associates seen 1  previously and not
tested
16 Sloman, Hayman, Ohta,
Law, and Tulving (1988)
672 14 Grads Words Completion Fragments presented in reverse order
17 Squire (1989) 1078 15 UG, elderly Word strings Recognition Names of TV shows (mean age 41)
18 Strong (1913) 100 13 a Adults Words Recognition Recognize from a list twice as long as the
study list
18 Strong (1913) 100 13 b Adults Words Recognition Recognize from a list twice as long as the
study list
19 Strong (1913) 40 13 a Adults Words Recognition Recognize from a list twice as long as the
study list
19 Strong (1913) 40 13 b Adults Words Recognition Recognize from a list twice as long as the
study list
20 Strong (1913) 20 13 Adults Words Recognition Recognize from a list twice as long as the
study list
21 Thompson (1982) 128 9 Undergrads Dates Recognition Memorable events generated by college
roommate
22 Wixted and Ebbesen (1991) 432 5 a Undergrads Words Recall Learned list well before test
22 Wixted and Ebbesen (1991) 432 5 b Undergrads Words Recall Learned list poorly before test
23 Wickelgren (1968) 46 8 H.M. Spoken digits Recognition Determine whether 1 digit was in the list
24 Wickelgren (1968) 40 5 H.M. Spoken digits Recognition Determine whether 3 digit number was in a
list of 5
25 Wickelgren (1968) 50 7 H.M. Spoken digits Recognition Determine whether 3 digit number was in a
list of 7
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9Appendix B. Statistical comments
B.1. Jeﬀreys prior and worst-case inference
In this paper we have sampled parameter sets from Jeﬀreys (1961) distribution
pðhjMÞ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
detðIðhÞÞ
p
R
X
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
detðIðhÞÞ
p
dh
;
where X denotes the parameter space and IðhÞ¼½ iabðhÞ  denotes the Fisher information matrix
iabðhÞ¼  ED
o2 lnpðDjhÞ
ohaohb
  
:
Using Jeﬀreys distribution as a prior over the parameters is common in Bayesian statistics, partly because
it is reparameterization-invariant, but also because it is a uniform distribution on the space of probability
distributions (Balasubramanian, 1997). It is in this sense that Jeﬀreys distribution is a ‘‘worst case’’ (or
non-informative) distribution. Under Jeﬀreys prior, the amount of prior uncertainty about the probability
distribution pð jM;hÞ, is maximized. This diﬀers from the uniform distribution, which maximizes uncer-
tainty about h. Since it is generally acknowledged that parameters of a model are rather arbitrary ‘‘in-
dexing tools,’’ it is better to work with the probability distributions themselves when justifying a prior. We
have chosen Jeﬀreys prior here because it treats each (distinguishable) probability distribution equally.
It is worth noting that this issue falls within the larger question of how to set reasonable priors for
Bayesian inference (see Kass & Wasserman, 1996 for a thorough discussion). While this matter is beyond
the scope of this paper, we note in passing that it is often worth considering a number of diﬀerent priors, in
order to check that the results are not unduly inﬂuenced by the prior. In general, however, we feel that
‘‘worst-case’’ priors are a reasonable ﬁrst choice.
Unfortunately, these desirable properties can come at a cost: in some cases it is diﬃcult to sample from
Jeﬀreys distribution, and may require Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (MCMC; see Gilks, Richard-
son, & Spiegelhalter, 1995). Fortunately, MCMC is now a standard technique in statistics, available
through widely available software such as BUGS. In other cases, such as when the error distribution is
normal, closed forms are available, making the sampling simpler.
B.2. Landscaping and Bayesian marginals
We brieﬂy discuss the connections between landscaping and Bayesian statistics (e.g., Gill, 2002; Rob-
ert, 2001). Although the basic statistical foundations of the technique are established here, it would be nice
to explore this further, pursuing the connections with Bayesian methods and Minimum Description
Length (e.g. Gr€ unwald, 2000; Rissanen, 1996). From a Bayesian perspective, one deﬁnes the predictive dis-
tribution for the data as
pðDjMÞ¼
Z
pðDjM;hÞpðhjMÞdh:
This states that the data D are sampled from M according to its marginal distribution. It is well-known
that, because they consider the behavior of the model across its entire parameter space (i.e., by adopting a
global model analysis), Bayesian approaches are able to identify and compensate for model complexity
(Myung & Pitt, 1997).
Notice, however, that the landscaping approach also speciﬁes a prior distribution pðhjMÞ, from which
the parameters are sampled, and a likelihood function pðDjM;hÞ from which the data are generated. In
short, landscape data are sampled from the Bayesian marginal distribution pðDjMÞ. In this sense, there
is a direct connection between landscaping and Bayesian model selection.
As a ﬁnal note, this observation allows us to make the notion of ‘‘distinguishability’’ a little more ex-
plicit. Under one deﬁnition, two models would be indistinguishable if they both contained the data-gen-
erating distribution. We prefer not to use this deﬁnition, since it would allow one to ‘‘cheat,’’ by proposing
very elaborate models that incorporate an enormous number of distributions. Rather, we adopt the ‘‘uni-
80 D.J. Navarro et al. / Cognitive Psychology 49 (2004) 47–84versal distribution’’ approach (e.g., Rissanen, 2001), in which a family of distributions can be ‘‘summa-
rized’’ by a single distribution. In this case, the marginal distribution pðDjMÞ is a universal distribution.
Under this approach, two models are considered to be indistinguishable if their universal distributions
are highly similar to one another.
B.3. Representativeness and partial information Bayes
Suppose, however, that we were not interested the likelihood of the data itself pðDjMÞ. Rather, we were
interested in the likelihood of the ﬁts to that data for two models, x and y. That is, x ¼ lnpðDjMX;h
 Þ and
y ¼ lnpðDjMY;h
 Þ, the maximum log-likelihood for the data obtained under the models. The quantity that
we are interested in is the probability of observing both x and y if the data were truly generated from MX.
This is denoted pðx;yjMXÞ, and corresponds to the quantity that we have called the representativeness of
the ﬁts. It is important to note that x and y depend directly on the data set D, but only indirectly on
pðDjMÞ, through the data itself. A Bayesian approach yields
pðx;yjMXÞ¼
Z
pðx;yjMX;hÞpðhjMXÞdh:
The pðx;yjMX;hÞ quantity is the probability of generating a data set from model X at some parameters h
that yields the same ﬁts x and y as the original data set D. Note that x and y are statistics of the data set D
and the model set (X and Y), and do not carry as much information as the data itself (and is therefore
called the ‘‘partial information’’ Bayesian marginal by Geweke (1999a, 1999b)). Indeed the relationship
between pðx;yjMÞ and pðDjMÞ may be non-trivial. However, given that the ﬁts x and y are commonly used
to draw inferences about models, it is useful to consider the likelihood of observing them given MX or MY.
Accordingly, the representativeness of these ﬁts is an important consideration when evaluating models.
Ideally, the representativeness could be found by solving this integral analytically. In general, however,
the integral is intractable and must be approximated. It is worth noting that the commonly used Laplace
approximation (de Bruijn, 1958; Kass & Raftery, 1995) is inappropriate, as the posterior is not well-ap-
proximated by a multivariate Gaussian. With this in mind, we estimate it numerically, using the N sets
of landscape data, denoted L ¼ð L1;...;LNÞ. Formally, we estimated the representativeness of D for model
X using the Nadaraya–Watson kernel-weighted average
^ pðxD;yDjMXÞ¼
PN
i¼1 K½xD   xLi;yD   yLi  SðiÞ
PN
i¼1 K½xD   xLi;yD   yLi 
where Kðx;yÞ denotes the kernel, a bivariate Gaussian distribution with mean at (x;y), and SðiÞ is an
indicator function that equals 1 if the ith data set is from MX, and 0 otherwise. Subscripts are used to
indicate which data set the ﬁts x and y refer to. This is the representativeness measure reported in this
paper. Since we wished to be very generous to the models, these distributions had covariance matrix equal
to 10   I, where I denotes the identity matrix. The choice of 10 is somewhat arbitrary, and users wishing to
do a precise analysis should certainly consider some formal procedure for choosing an optimal kernel
variance. In this application, however, our interest is in setting an overly large kernel width, because of our
‘‘mice and tigers’’ approach. Accordingly, the kernel width of 10 is excessively large for these data. In any
case, the statistical properties of the Nadaraya–Watson estimator can be found in Hastie et al. (2001).
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